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Lessons on the political coordination of  
knowledge and innovation policies 
Dietmar Braun 
The article takes up the main questions developed in the introduction and endeavours to give a 
synthetic account of the findings in the various country studies in this special issue of SPP. In a 
nutshell, one can see an impressive account of reform activities concerning the improvement of the 
political coordination of knowledge and innovation policies. It turns out that internal coordination by 
way of a superministry might not be the optimal solution for coordination problems. External 
coordination under the influence of ‘moral contracts’ at the top-level of decision-making on the 
ministerial level and newly designed and delegated coordinating bodies at the agency level might be 
better ways to proceed. Policy-makers have to pay attention though to keep the balance between the 
pressing need for better political coordination and the need for an autonomous development of basic 
research, higher education, professional education, and technological application. 
HE OBJECTIVE OF THIS SPECIAL ISSUE 
of Science and Public Policy is to identify — 
on the base of four country studies — the  
political conditions for adapting the political gov-
ernance structure to dynamics in the knowledge 
space. Adaptation was mainly seen as the capacity to 
organise the ‘machinery of government’ in such a 
way that encompassing and far-reaching coordina-
tion, i.e. ‘policy coordination’ (see the introduction 
to this special issue), of the different institutional 
actors would become possible. The introduction to 
this special issue of Science and Public Policy 
evoked a number of possible hurdles that could 
complicate the adaptation process, such as the insti-
tutional complexity — in some cases also caused by 
federal structures — that comes into the game of 
governing the knowledge space; lacking leadership 
and/or strategic intelligence; cultural segmentation 
of organisational units and standard interests of ac-
tors. In addition, it was asked if ‘internal coordina-
tion’ by means of a ‘superministry’ would be the 
most advantageous way of reaching policy coordina-
tion. After having presented the four countries and 
their ways to deal with these issues, what are the 
general lessons that we can draw for inspiring future 
political practice? 
Activities to improve coordination capacities 
After studying the four cases, the obvious fact is that 
each of them — and this is also confirmed by the 
numerous country studies we find in the OECD 
study (OECD, 2005) and in the Technopolis report 
(Arnold and Boekholt, 2003) — have been active in 
ameliorating their coordination capacities in one 
way or another. There is clearly an increased aware-
ness of the linkage between dynamics in the knowl-
edge space and the political organisation of 
coordination in the governance of the knowledge 
space. What is interesting, though, is how this 
awareness has come about. It has not simply been a 
matter of linear, functional adaptation to already on-
going integrating trends in the knowledge space. The 
causal chain has been different: In all countries of 
our population there was first the insight that — and 
this concerned above all the link between basic and 
technological research/application but more recently 
also education and professional education — a 
stronger integration on the ‘operational level’ of the 
knowledge space was needed in order to be prepared 
for future developments. 
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A stronger integration meant most of the time 
bringing the various sectoral operational institutions 
in the knowledge space closer together and inducing 
more cooperation. It was this process that had a 
backlash on political governance institutions: As 
political responsibilities for the various operational 
institutions were most of the time divided among 
several actors both at the level of ministries and 
agencies, integration at the operational level forced 
political actors to think about a stronger integration 
of their relationships. Therefore change processes on 
the operational level, induced by political steering, 
as a consequence led to pressure on the machinery of 
government. 
Dynamics in the knowledge space have certainly 
been one driver for reform attempts with regard to 
political coordination but they have not been the 
only one. Another important driver that emerged 
from the discussion is without any doubt the Euro-
pean Research Area (ERA). This has led all four 
countries — and Switzerland was no exception de-
spite not being a member of the EU — to think 
about uniting forces within the country. This can be 
seen in Germany with its ‘internationalisation initia-
tive’; in Switzerland where the ‘international envi-
ronment’ is a central argument in the discussion on 
the creation of a superministry; in Finland where the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry has been assigned 
the task of organising a stronger interministerial col-
laboration in order to organise the Finnish response 
to the ERA and where the creation of the recent su-
perministry on trade, industry, labour and regional 
development can be understood in a similar way; 
and finally in Denmark where the establishment of 
the Globalisation Council in 2005 was at least partly 
a response to the ERA. 
The activities of revising the machinery of gov-
ernment varies between countries and to judge 
whether these revisions have been successful is often 
difficult, among other things because many reforms 
have only been recently established, for example, the 
reorganisation of the ‘superministry’ in Denmark in 
2006, the revised University Conference in Switzer-
land in 2005, the reorganisation of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry into a ‘superministry’ in Finland 
in 2008 or the various ‘soft coordination procedures’ 
which have been launched in Germany in 2006–
2008. But the important point is that reforms have 
taken place everywhere. 
The creation of the Ministry for Science, Science 
Consultancy and Technological Change in Denmark 
— though its name implies an encompassing view 
on matters of the knowledge space — cannot in the 
first instance be seen as an example for a reform en-
visaging better coordination as it was completely 
inspired by the logic of political coalition-building 
and served to satisfy only the demands of a small 
coalition partner. It lacked political support and co-
hesion. Subsequent additions and subtraction of di-
visions to this ministry confirm that it was most of 
the time the political logic and not the functional 
logic of adapting governance structure to dynamics 
in the knowledge space which played a role in re-
forms. This changed somewhat in 2001 with the 
creation of the ‘superministry’ of Science, Technol-
ogy and Innovation, which signalled a stronger 
awareness of the necessity to react to changing inte-
gration demands in the knowledge space. A more 
substantial will to reform coordination capacities 
can, however, only be seen with the establishment of 
the Globalisation Council in 2005 and its publication 
of the Strategy for Denmark in the Global Economy 
report. This has launched without a doubt a new élan 
with regard to the development of more cohesive 
strategies among ministries. Its success cannot yet 
be estimated. 
While Denmark has opted mostly but not com-
pletely for internal coordination within one ministry, 
Germany is the example of a country where major 
institutional reforms of governance structures  
favouring better coordination are lacking. The reor-
ganisations that have taken place are a product of the 
general federal reform and cannot be understood in 
the context of dynamics of the knowledge space. 
Activities that are linked to the knowledge space — 
the excellence initiative, the high tech strategy or the 
internationalisation initiative — have not changed 
the machinery of government but seem at least to 
lead to ‘soft coordination’, i.e. to more communica-
tion among ministries, stronger vertical coordina-
tion, and also to a revision of internal coordination 
in ministries. Whether it will be successful remains 
to be seen. 
Switzerland has reformed some of its institutions 
and is still in the middle of a discussion on the mer-
its of creating a superministry on education, re-
search, and innovation. Its main reform linked to 
matters of the knowledge space consists in the 
strengthening of the University Conference, which 
has become the main strategic political body of the 
federal government and member states responsible 
for the development of the higher education land-
scape. As higher education institutions are both the 
major higher education and research institutions in 
Switzerland, the function of this body has become 
central for the governance of the four policy fields of 
the knowledge space: higher education, professional 
education, research, and technological development. 
If Switzerland would in addition introduce a super-
ministry on the federal level, one could speak of a 
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strong institutionalisation of coordination capacities 
that would have taken place then. 
Finland, finally, has, in contrast to the other three 
countries, reacted very early and in a comprehensive 
manner. The well-known Science and Technology 
Council, which is still at the heart of political coor-
dination in Finland, was established in 1987. Its 
policies have led to a positive development in the 
relationships between ministries, which have made 
the step from pure negative coordination to the de-
velopment of common policies. The creation of the 
new Ministry of Employment and Economy marks 
the effort to engage in a broader perspective of or-
ganising innovation policies as it is no longer only 
policy areas that are directly linked to the knowledge 
space but also other fields of relevance, such as re-
gional development or the labour market, that are 
integrated into coordination efforts to organise inno-
vation policies. 
In sum, the overview confirms what has been said 
in the beginning, that all countries have been and are 
still active in reforming their coordination capacities 
but they do it in different ways and to different de-
grees in terms of institutionalisation. Denmark and 
Switzerland have opted for a stronger institutionali-
sation of coordination capacities while Germany 
remains reluctant to change its governance structures 
and prefers to introduce more temporary and less 
binding mechanisms. Finland has for a long time not 
institutionalised coordination on the ministerial or 
agency level but built its positive performance above 
all on the guiding capacities of the Science and 
Technology Council, which instructed political insti-
tutional actors about ways to coordinate. 
Dealing with institutional complexity 
The most challenging issue for successful coordina-
tion of governance of knowledge and innovation 
policies is certainly the institutional complexity that 
underlies any reform of coordination capacities. The 
existence of three vertical governance levels — 
cabinet, ministries, agencies — and at least two (and 
often more) horizontal levels demonstrate that po-
litical coordination cannot be the outcome of an  
evolutionary process but must be designed and pro-
moted. The main challenge is however not just insti-
tutional complexity but also the inherent tendencies 
of fragmentarisation and autonomisation, which 
must be overcome. The main question is how the 
countries have dealt with institutional complexity 
and inherent tendencies of fragmentation. 
According to the introduction to this special issue 
of Science and Public Policy, governance modes — 
leadership, strategic intelligence, and ministerial 
coordination (external and internal coordination) — 
are the main mechanisms of dealing with institu-
tional fragmentation. How have countries used these 
resources or means and what can we learn? 
Before we raise each point separately we will 
briefly discuss federalism as one additional dimen-
sion in the institutional complexity of governing the 
knowledge space. 
Federal complexity 
The problem of institutional complexity has played a 
prominent role in federal countries, which had to 
deal with the ‘federal divide’ between the central 
level and member state level. The two federal  
countries in this special issue of Science and Public 
Policy have been deliberately chosen in order to un-
derstand how this dimension would affect coordina-
tion capacities in comparison to unitary states. 
As expected, one can state on the base of our  
two federal cases that the federal dimension is an 
additional hurdle to overcome and that it increases 
transaction costs of coordination to a considerable 
extent. Federalism is not only important; it is omni-
present and, given the concurrency of competences, 
determines coordination discussions with regard to 
the knowledge space on almost every occasion. 
In Switzerland the reorganisation of governance 
of higher education institutions, which at the same 
time concerns also the research and technology field, 
has been dominated by attempts to find a consensus 
between the cantons, which are responsible for uni-
versities, and the federal government, which not 
only has two technical universities of its own and 
co-finances cantonal universities but is also respon-
sible for a substantial part for higher professional 
education institutions. In the end the institutionalisa-
tion of federal coordination has been achieved and 
now allows for a stronger integration of higher edu-
cation institutions in the knowledge space as well as 
between governing institutions, including two fed-
eral ministries. 
In Germany the federal government and member 
states have been endeavouring to coordinate their 
efforts for quite some time in the Science Council, 
the Conference of Education Ministers (KMK) and 
in the area of joint tasks (financing of extra-
university institutions). On the other hand we do see 
almost no efforts to coordinate research and innova-
tion policies between both territorial levels. The 
judgment on institutionalised federal coordination is 
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negative with regard to the promotion of overall co-
ordination capacities: The KMK has seldom been 
instrumental in developing common policies and 
was not set up to coordinate different policy areas; 
the financing of extra-university institutions was not 
inspired by attempts of developing joint policies. 
The only more positively regarded institution, the 
Science Council, in which scientists, federal and 
member state representatives participate, has been 
important in launching discussions and delivering 
useful analysis but is conceived neither as a policy-
making body nor as a coordinating institution. 
Recent developments have made cross-sectoral 
policy coordination in Germany even more difficult: 
Contrary to tendencies in Switzerland, Germany is 
now going in the direction of separating concurrent 
tasks, among them responsibilities for higher educa-
tion policy which are now clearly in the hands of 
member states while the federal government has just 
some influence in the joint monitoring and evalua-
tion of universities. This means that, except for 
monitoring, Germany, has no institutionalised means 
of coordinating federalism with regard to knowledge 
policy areas. Higher education policies are under the 
sole responsibility of the member states; research 
and technology policies are not coordinated; and 
professional education is organised along the lines of 
a division of labour between the federal government 
and member states. Given the importance of both 
levels for the governance of the knowledge space, 
this is no good omen for future coordination capaci-
ties in Germany. 
Switzerland has gone in a completely different di-
rection from Germany, not only with regard to the 
joint organisation of higher education policies, 
which implicitly also link research and technology 
policies to the University Conference. In addition, 
Switzerland has in its new constitutional articles on 
education, which were adopted in 2006, clearly 
given the federal government the lead in matters of 
the knowledge space: it has the leadership in harmo-
nising professional education and it can force can-
tons to harmonise in matters of primary and 
secondary education if there is no self-organisation; 
research and innovation policies are under authority 
of the federal government even if it must be shared 
with cantons in the University Conference. With 
these reforms, Switzerland has developed a more 
suitable authority structure in federalism in order to 
organise cooperation in the governance of the 
knowledge space than Germany. 
There is one additional aspect of federalism, 
which we will not find in unitary countries, and  
that is the discussion on the congruence of govern-
ance structures between the federal and member-
state levels. This discussion plays a role in both 
countries but again in completely reverse senses. In 
Switzerland the federal government is induced to 
create a superministry for education, research and 
innovation among other things because member 
states have most of the time already done so. In 
Germany the introduction of a superministry seems 
impossible according to Edler and Kuhlmann (see 
this special issue of Science and Public Policy) be-
cause member states have no such organisation. So, 
in one case federalism acts as a catalyst for more 
coordination at the central level and in the other case 
it prevents a stronger institutionalisation of coordi-
nation capacities. 
All this only demonstrates that federalism is a 
primary hurdle political actors have to deal with to 
develop coordination capacities in the knowledge 
space. Given the concurrent competencies or divided 
competencies in knowledge policy areas, there is no 
escape from finding ways and means to coordinate 
actions between the federal government and member 
states if they want to adapt to dynamics in the 
knowledge space. This takes time and energy, as 
Switzerland demonstrates, but it is feasible. 
Governance modes 
How authority is exercised and how actor relation-
ships are organised can be an important means to 
overcome resistance of actors to participate in coor-
dination. There are various governance modes that 
are at the disposition of political actors, i.e. hierarchy, 
delegation, bargaining, or moral obligation. 
Hierarchy It seems that at least one expectation 
mentioned in the introduction to this special issue of 
Science and Public Policy has been confirmed in this 
sense: ‘hierarchy’ is not the governance mode that is 
preferred in the machinery of government or even in 
the relationship between the governance and the op-
erational level. Of course, one finds hierarchy in the 
machinery of government but that is often not for the 
good of developing coordination. The frequent reor-
ganisation of the composition of ministries in Den-
mark and Germany — and to a lesser extent in Finland 
and Switzerland — demonstrates the decision-
making powers of the prime minister and of the cabi-
net. Bureaucratic organisation can be changed by a 
simple pen stroke of political leaders. But this only 
means that the composition of ministries is often not 
conceived according to a functional logic but to a 
logic respecting power distribution requirements. At 
the same time it demonstrates that ministries are often 
not more than ad hoc aggregations of governance 
fields that will have difficulties in developing internal 
cohesion, nor do they need to. The isolated role of IT 
and telecommunication in the Danish superministry is 
an example. Hierarchy as a governance mode is there-
fore omnipresent in the machinery of government. 
The question is whether it is also used in favour of 
developing coordination capacities. Let us have a 
brief look at the various vertical levels: 
• Hierarchy seems not to govern relationships  
between the cabinet and ministries. In all four 
countries, ministries seem to have a relatively 
autonomous status, limiting direct powers of the 
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prime minister or the cabinet. This is an effect of 
coalition governments that attribute posts of min-
isters to different parties that see ministries as 
their strongholds. The influence on ministries is 
only strong if all participants in the cabinet have 
decided on a joint strategy, but this is a different 
governance mode (see below). 
• Hierarchy cannot be an option on the ministerial 
level because ministers are peers and not subject 
to authority relationships. The only hierarchical 
role can be attributed to the finance minister who 
can accept or refuse the financing of the ministe-
rial budget. The finance minister has no coordi-
nating role though. 
• The working of hierarchy within ministries is dif-
ficult to assess. Several reasons were given in the 
introduction why it would not work, depending 
above all on the ‘span of control’. Larger minis-
tries with an accumulation of various policy areas 
make it difficult for the minister to use hierarchi-
cal authority because of lack of information and 
time restrictions. Divisions have in general a con-
siderable autonomy. From the country studies 
presented we can at least deduce that the limita-
tions of the use of hierarchy also hold for our ex-
amples: the introduction of new public 
management methods in Finland and Denmark 
within ministries is a sign that previous hierarchi-
cal relationships were suboptimal. Edler and 
Kuhlmann report the strong fragmentation within 
the Ministry of Education and Technology and the 
difficulty in developing coordination. Simple  
orders apparently do not work. One cannot create 
coordination on the base of order. It needs either 
voluntary agreements or incentive structures for 
actors to do so. 
• Hierarchical relations between ministries and 
agencies are not excluded. This is confirmed by 
the status of project agencies in Germany and the 
Commission for Technology and Innovation in 
Switzerland. But as was already stipulated in the 
introduction to this special issue of Science and 
Public Policy, agencies have often a semi-public 
or private status and are therefore protected from 
direct orders. In this case ministries have increas-
ingly used another governance mode to have a 
stronger influence on these agencies, i.e. new pub-
lic management (see below). One resource that 
governmental actors often have though is the hi-
erarchical power to dissolve agencies, create new 
ones and to reorganise them in a substantial way. 
This is not always possible but in many countries 
it is. We will come back to this point below. 
In sum, hierarchy seems not to be the right option 
for improving coordination capacities in governing 
the knowledge space. Other governance modes are 
more prominent. 
Delegation If one speaks of delegation one usually 
means today a governance mode that is based on 
lessons from new public management, which is itself 
composed of different theoretical approaches; 
among them principal-agent theory, which attributes 
strategic powers to the higher level of the authority 
structure, and operational freedom to the lower 
‘agency’ level. 
Without any doubt, new public management and 
with it delegation have become omnipresent govern-
ance tools in countries not only to steer operational 
institutions or agencies but even divisions within 
ministries. Denmark and Finland are recent exam-
ples of this: Denmark decided in 2006 to reorganise 
the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation 
by transferring personnel from the ‘department’ to 
the three ‘agencies’ within the ministry; and Finland 
united the divisions for university, science, and poly-
technics in the Ministry of Education and introduced 
performance contracts to define their missions. 
Advantages of new public management delega-
tion that are often mentioned are the increased ca-
pacities of the ‘principal’ to steer or guide the 
activities of agencies as the separation between 
strategy development and operation allows for a 
concentration of activities and more time. The use of 
performance contracts helps to implement strategies 
and to control outcomes. The operational autonomy 
for agencies on the other hand gives them more 
room for manoeuvre and allows for more creativity. 
There is more flexibility in using resources. 
New public management delegation is not con-
ceived as a means for coordination but it can of 
course be used for this purpose. Denmark has done 
so with regard to operational institutions and Swit-
zerland has tried to do the same with regard to its 
research funding agencies. It was, however, also ob-
served in the country studies that new public man-
agement delegation can have opposing effects on 
coordination capacities, which is also recognised in 
general discussions on the utility of new public 
management in the public service: the operational 
autonomy of agencies leads to the creation of more 
self-determined actors who develop their own stan-
dard interests. As a consequence, even with per-
formance contracts at hand, it becomes more 
difficult to bring these standard interests in line and 
impose coordination (Frissen, 1999). In this special 
issue of Science and Public Policy, Pelkonen et al 
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consider new public management as a failure  
because of these tendencies. Koch confirms this ob-
servation for Denmark, and the attempt for imposed 
coordination between agencies in Switzerland sim-
ply failed as Griessen and Braun explain. 
New public management delegation is obviously 
not built to develop networks and cooperation 
(Braun, 2006). It is developed to make vertical rela-
tionships more efficient but not horizontal ones. This 
is simply because it does not create incentive struc-
tures for coordination, even if one defines coordina-
tion as one of the objectives in the performance 
contract. It will usually be seen as a task that adds 
transaction costs without creating genuine benefits 
in the daily work of agencies. Only if cooperation 
would lead to real synergies, to a win–win game, 
would there be incentives for agencies to engage 
themselves in coordination. In this sense, it is doubt-
ful whether new public management can really be a 
governance mode ameliorating the coordination be-
tween organisational units of the machinery of gov-
ernment, independent of the organisational level 
where it takes place. 
Delegation can have its merits though if one cre-
ates institutions that have coordination as their  
raison d’être. In this case incentives to promote co-
ordination exist. Special interministerial committees 
as they exist in Switzerland could in principle fulfil 
such a function but usually these committees are a 
place for exchanging information and at the best for 
bargaining about some common projects. These 
committees do not have an organisational identity of 
their own. The use of the new public management 
philosophy could reorganise such committees by 
using performance contracts and giving them a more 
permanent status with an organisational nucleus 
such as a secretariat, etc. This would be an incentive 
for these committees to be more inventive and de-
termined in matters of coordination. 
But overall new public management seems not  
to be the right governance mode to improve  
cooperation. 
Bargaining and moral obligation What then is left 
as a suitable governance mode promoting political 
cooperation? 
If hierarchy and delegation seem suboptimal,  
bargaining would be the next candidate in the list. 
The problem with bargaining is that it is, first, not 
applicable in vertical relationships but only in hori-
zontal relationships and that, second, it means to 
find coordination agreements that entail ‘Pareto-
optimal solutions’ (see the introduction to this spe-
cial issue of Science and Public Policy), i.e. agree-
ments that promise more benefits than costs for all 
participants. Experience with bargaining situations 
as we find them, above all on the ministerial level, is 
not encouraging. Outcomes are usually negative  
coordination. Initiatives to promote better coordina-
tion usually fail. Bargaining does not seem to be 
promising for developing ‘policy coordination’. 
This statement must, however, be modified. Bar-
gaining can be ‘embedded’. The Finnish case, for 
example, mentions that bargaining may occur under 
the ‘shadow of hierarchy’: ministries can be obliged 
to bargain with each other. But even then solutions 
will be at the level of the lowest common denomina-
tor. Ministries may be obliged to develop some 
common policy programme but one will not find the 
development of common objectives and strategies 
on the basis of order, even if ministries can bargain 
about this. The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ does not seem 
to be the solution, then. 
Another form of embeddedness is, however, more 
suitable for coordination as our empirical studies 
reveal and this is bargaining that is taking place un-
der moral obligation. What does this mean? 
Bargaining must take place after joint agreements 
on the main objectives and priorities in the govern-
ance of the knowledge space have been reached at 
the highest political level where ministers partici-
pate. The mode to reach such joint agreements 
should not itself be based on bargaining but be based 
on ‘arguing’ (Elster, 1986). The process is similar to 
constitution-making in general: The discussion must 
be about the development of long-term strategies 
and a long-term policy order. If this is the subject of 
the political discussion, general principles and long-
term visions count and it becomes easier to abstract 
from selfish bargaining interests. The Finnish Sci-
ence and Technology Policy Council and the Danish 
Globalisation Council, partly also the German Sci-
ence Council, create such a forum for ‘arguing’. The 
rationale of discussions here is not to develop con-
crete action plans on specific subjects but to develop 
an overall strategy for the country, based on problem 
recognition and problem-solving. If actors can be 
integrated in such a forum and an agreement can be 
reached, this will work as a moral obligation for ac-
tors and bind them to the agreement in the future. It 
does not preclude selfish interests that may reappear 
but one can use the resource of moral obligation to 
remind ministers to respect the objectives agreed 
upon and try to build on them. 
This governance mode has successfully been used 
in Finland and Denmark, and has led to a much more 
positive attitude of ministries concerning coopera-
tion and some obvious success in developing such 
cooperation in Finland. In Denmark it still remains 
to be seen whether the final outcome will be positive 
in a similar way. One important feature seems to be 
lacking for being successful in Denmark, though, i.e. 
the institutionalisation of ‘moral obligation’ by mak-
ing the ‘forum’ a permanent one. The Globalisation 
Council was dissolved after having done its task. 
The Finnish Council has acted as permanent re-
minder for actors since 1987. 
There are certainly also disadvantages to the use 
of moral obligation: Agreements are difficult to 
agree upon and hence it will be difficult to revise 
them so that they may become out of date and work 
as a conservative force as Pelkonen et al describe: 
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As in the constitution, general principles and agree-
ments cannot be easily be amended. This is the con-
servative aspect of such a governance mode. On the 
other hand it becomes possible during the reign of 
such an agreement to find the cooperation of all ac-
tors that have been involved. Moral obligation seems 
therefore to be a conditio sine qua non for achieving 
encompassing political coordination concerning the 
knowledge space. 
While moral obligation may work on the ministe-
rial level, it may be difficult to apply it to the agency 
level. As agencies are most of the time not part of 
such high-level political forums, they may not feel 
obliged by decisions taken there. The governance of 
the agency level remains therefore a problem in 
terms of improving coordination between agencies 
after hierarchy and delegation have proven to be 
suboptimal. 
In this context one can come back, however, to 
one aspect of the hierarchy mode mentioned above 
and which might be helpful: Ministries often have 
the right to reorganise agencies, to dissolve and to 
create them. If this opportunity exists and ministries 
have found an agreement of cooperation between 
themselves, they might redefine the constitution of 
agencies or create new cross-sectoral institutions 
that have coordination between knowledge policy 
fields as a basic principle of action. As in the case of 
interministerial committees it would then be possible 
to use performance contracts to develop strategies 
and control success of coordination. 
But such a decision should be seen as the final 
stage of a longer sequence of reforms in the machin-
ery of government: first it would need the ‘forum’ 
on the highest level of politics and an agreement 
which defines the general policy in the governance 
of the knowledge space. This should induce minis-
tries to develop more cooperative relationships and 
which then can decide by ‘hierarchy’ to redesign the 
set up of the agency level. 
Leadership 
Governance modes are an important resource to deal 
with institutional complexity. Political leadership 
was mentioned in the introduction to this special 
issue of Science and Public Policy as a second pos-
sibility. Leadership refers to the role of the prime 
minister or the cabinet to promote encompassing 
policy coordination. 
The answer can be short: the autonomy of minis-
tries is relatively strong in all four countries, which 
reduces the role of the prime minister or the cabinet 
in guiding policies in a unilateral way. Political 
leadership in the two federal states, Germany and 
Switzerland, has in general been weak. In Finland 
and recently in Denmark this has been somewhat 
different as prime ministers became involved in the 
‘forum’, which was a very important symbolic step 
to give credibility to the forum and signal that the 
decisions of the forum will have the support of the 
government. And it is in this context that leadership 
seems to count: It can be important for the creation of 
a general and nation-wide consensus on knowledge 
and innovation policy.  
Once such an agreement has been found, the politi-
cal leader can exercise a role in the sense of ‘moral 
obligation’: he or she can personally remind the vari-
ous institutional actors of their consent and put pres-
sure on ministers to respect the agreement. In this 
sense leadership is important but it should not be con-
founded with hierarchical guidance. 
Strategic intelligence 
Strategic intelligence has been identified as a poten-
tial means to overcome selfish interests of political 
actors by the use of scientific knowledge that can 
‘rationalise’ discussions. This may help to attenuate 
the institutional fragmentation of the machinery of 
government of course only if scientists opt for policy 
coordination or if they receive the official task of 
paying attention to the improvement of political co-
ordination. In this respect one finds no case among 
our countries that has indeed used strategic intelli-
gence for the development of coordination in an in-
stitutionalised way. 
It is nevertheless illuminating whether and to 
what extent scientists and therefore strategic intelli-
gence has access to political decision-making. This 
at least indicates the possibility of rationalising the 
discussions and introducing a problem-solving atti-
tude in the discussions respectively. 
Our four country studies demonstrate three things: 
1. It is most likely that the scientific voice will be 
heard in ‘forums’ like the Finnish Council and the 
Danish Globalisation Council, where actors are 
obliged to ‘argue’ instead of bargaining. Though 
we do not have information to what extent the 
scientists that participated within the mentioned 
councils have indeed had an important influence 
on the decisions taken, there is no doubt that  
the forum prepares the ground for scientific  
arguments. 
2. A ‘corporatist’ chamber such as the German Sci-
ence Council, where scientists and politicians 
meet and in which all recommendations are first 
prepared by scientists before they are discussed 
by politicians, can be and has been a useful  
 
Moral obligation seems therefore to  
be a conditio sine qua non for 
achieving encompassing political 
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institution. Germany’s problem has only been that 
the Science Council has no mandate to develop 
more encompassing policies or to take care of the 
political coordination between the different insti-
tutional actors. It would not be impossible, 
though, to introduce a further going mandate for 
the Science Council in this sense. 
3. Scientific advisory bodies directly linked to the 
political leader have seldom had a major influence 
on strategy development or on political coordina-
tion. This is demonstrated by the various bodies 
that have existed until now in Germany and which 
were designed to advise the chancellor in devel-
oping above all a more future-oriented technology 
policy. And it is proven in the case of Switzerland 
where the Science Council has proven impotent to 
make itself heard by policy-makers despite its 
mandate to advise the cabinet directly in all mat-
ters concerning the strategy development in 
knowledge and innovation policy. 
External and internal ministerial coordination 
The final question we would like to address — and 
this also concerns dealing with institutional com-
plexity — is the question of how to organise coordi-
nation at the level of ministries. The general option 
at the disposition of political actors is to organise 
policy fields of the knowledge space in two or more 
ministries (external coordination) or within one  
ministry (internal coordination). 
In the introduction several expectations concerning 
both options were formulated: 
• External coordination seems to cause a permanent 
struggle between standard interests of ministries 
and to favour negative coordination. Bargaining  
is generally the main governance mode, which 
means, as explained above, that only Pareto-
optimal outcomes are possible. 
• Internal coordination has some advantages. A 
newly created ‘superministry’ can create a new 
élan in policies of the knowledge space; the devel-
opment of inter-sectoral policies may be part of the 
constitution of the ministry; hierarchical powers 
within the ministry can be used to close ranks; and 
a superministry would lower transaction costs con-
cerning the coordination of policy areas. Negative 
points mentioned were the possible exclusion of 
other relevant areas for knowledge and innovation 
policies; an increased competition with other min-
istries leading to a possible backlash in resources; a 
continuing internal fragmentation because of ad-
ministrative cultural divisions and therefore still 
high transaction costs; the supposition that bar-
gaining instead of hierarchy may prevail. 
External coordination On the base of our empiri-
cal examples one can say that the expectations  
were justified: interministerial coordination remains 
in general at a low level. It is mostly negative  
coordination, which prevails if there are no joint 
agreements at the level of the cabinet. Spontaneous 
positive or policy coordination does not seem to 
evolve. And even if there are specialised interminis-
terial institutions such as the ‘steering committee’ in 
Switzerland, this has not helped because these com-
mittees remain dependent on the initiatives and the 
good will of ministries. Of course we find other 
mechanisms — for example, the ‘joint budget pro-
posal’ in Switzerland — that can at least force  
ministries to talk to each other and discuss the possi-
bility of joint actions. But again this seems seldom 
to result in common action. If the knowledge area is 
divided up between two ministries — which is the 
case in Switzerland, Germany, and Finland, and 
even in Denmark there is still a Ministry of Educa-
tion next to the superministry — one invariably 
finds different cultures and ways to see things be-
tween ministries, which makes cooperation difficult. 
Finland has nevertheless been able to overcome such 
retarding effects. Finland was able, without creating 
a superministry, to develop positive coordination, 
i.e. the formulation of certain common policies. And 
despite very different ministerial cultures, informal 
contacts are good. 
Pelkonen et al are overtly positive about external 
coordination between ministries, which seems to be 
relatively well developed. This can only be  
explained, as already said, by the general consensus 
at the cabinet level, but also by the stability of the 
institutional setup and the development of trust rela-
tionships between ministries because of the long 
time that cooperative relationships had to develop. 
This does not mean that Finnish ministries would 
refuse competition or the strife for dominance, as the 
example of the leadership question in policies ad-
dressed to the European Union demonstrates. It cer-
tainly needs from time to time high-level initiatives 
to drive external coordination at the ministerial level 
further but in general this seems to be possible. 
The message is therefore again that external coor-
dination seems to be possible if a general consensus 
is found on policy priorities and strategies and  
coordination at the level of the cabinet that can 
trickle down to the ministerial level. 
The examples in the other countries demonstrate 
the difficulties if such a general consensus has not 
been possible: 
• One finds constant difficulties and unfriendly 
competition between the Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and Innovation and the Ministry of 
Education in Denmark. 
• The relationships between the Ministry of Interior 
in Switzerland, responsible for education and sci-
ence policy, and the Ministry of Economy, re-
sponsible for professional education, technology 
and innovation policy, are more in terms of  
mutual adjustment, negative coordination and  
occasional exchange of information than inspired 
by a sense of joint effort. 
Conclusion 
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• For Germany, Edler and Kuhlmann state that 
overall coordination is poor and that one does not 
see real efforts of coordination between the Min-
istry of Education and Technology, the Ministry 
of Economy and Industry and other sectoral min-
istries. Only — and this again confirms our ex-
pectations — because of the pressure of the EU 
and the internationalisation initiative which has 
been decided at the level of the cabinet do we see 
some efforts to ameliorate external coordination. 
The results are not yet clear. 
This confirms the difficulties one could expect for 
external coordination of ministries. Spontaneous 
policy coordination is very unlikely and even 
mechanisms specifically designed to improve exter-
nal coordination will fail as long as there is no gen-
eral strategy that has been decided at the highest 
level of politics and that demands coordination  
efforts from ministries. 
Internal coordination as an alternative seems not to 
be a solution. The Danish superministry, the Minis-
try for Science, Technology, and Innovation, is 
more an example confirming the arguments against 
the creation of a superministry. One notices accord-
ing to Koch in this special issue a strong fragmenta-
tion between the divisions composing the ministry 
due to cultural splits. Such fragmentation even holds 
within the division for science, technology, and  
innovation. The mere implantation of different or-
ganisational and functional units within one ministry 
does not yet lead to a common vision and joint  
efforts. This needs time and an active strategy of 
building shared worldviews. Germany confirms this 
example within the context of the Ministry of Edu-
cation and Technology: despite transverse divisions 
that are used to ameliorate internal coordination 
such cooperation has remained weak and fragmenta-
tion along the lines of funding programmes contin-
ues to exist (see Edler and Kuhlmann in this special 
issue). 
Finnish policy-makers have discussed but refused 
to create a superministry for education, science, and 
technology. The reasons for that seem to be of gen-
eral relevance: the fusion of previously separated 
organisational units belonging to different ministries 
might break down vertical ties (networks, and exper-
tise) that are a very important asset for developing 
sectoral policies and also existing horizontal ties 
between divisions within ministries. 
This is why — next to the other arguments against 
a superministry mentioned above — the creation of 
a superministry seems not to be the answer to coor-
dination problems. The negative side effects seem 
very important and there is no guarantee that hierar-
chy works or that cultural segmentation can be over-
come, at least not on the short or medium term. 
Transaction costs to create such a superministry are 
moreover very high given the breaking down of  
existing organisational arrangements. 
Searching for optimal solutions 
Is there then a recommendation that one can formu-
late on the base of these critical remarks? Is there  
an optimal solution for overcoming institutional  
fragmentation? 
We think that, to give an answer to these ques-
tions, one should have a critical look at the func-
tional need for political coordination itself. Political 
coordination cannot be an objective in itself, void of 
any content. It must be used to improve the inter-
faces between knowledge policy areas but one 
should be reminded that the development of higher 
education, professional education, technological ap-
plication and basic research is not always dependent 
on interfaces. Each knowledge policy area continues 
to exist as an area of its own that needs special ‘gar-
dening’. This is why, for example, the creation of a 
superministry entailing all four fields may also be a 
danger as it may focus too much on coordination 
instead of also developing each area as such. It is for 
this reason that a political organisation that has  
latent coordination capacities that can be tapped but 
that also keeps strong capacities to develop each 
sectoral area independently would obviously be the 
ideal solution. 
After having analysed the various options for or-
ganising political coordination, it seems to us that 
external coordination between ministries is still the 
best way to go, first of all because in this way verti-
cal and horizontal ties of these ministries or their 
divisions can be maintained and therefore the sec-
toral development of policy areas be promoted. 
Moreover, because it avoids the problems that may 
appear with the creation of a superministry, such as 
rising transaction costs, rising competition and 
probably continuing cultural fragmentation prob-
lems. External coordination can, however, only work 
if — this is one of the central lessons of this special 
issue — an overall consensus on long-term policy 
goals and priorities can be reached that integrates the 
moral obligation to develop political coordination 
across knowledge policy areas. Such a consensus 
should be institutionalised within a high-level policy 
body that watches over the implementation of the 
consensus. 
 
External coordination can only work if 
an overall consensus on long-term 
policy goals and priorities can be 
reached that integrates the moral 
obligation to develop political 
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If in addition one installs interministerial commit-
tees that have the sole task of developing interminis-
terial cooperation, which obtain the status of 
organisation and which are bound by a performance 
contract, one would also have actors with a standard 
interest in the development of political coordination. 
Such a view has of course repercussions for the 
organisation of the agency level. If external coordi-
nation prevails on the ministerial level it would be a 
mistake to strive for a fusion of agencies at the 
agency level. A more suitable way would be to  
introduce more ‘redundancy’ into the system, i.e. to 
create additional agencies that are specialised in pre-
paring the coordination between policy fields. This 
of course will cause delimitation problems and com-
petition with existing agencies but it has the advan-
tage of freeing these agencies from engaging in an 
action that is overtly seen as an additional burden 
but not as a benefit. 
The mentioned ‘coordination group’ in Denmark 
seems to be an example that goes in this direction 
though it is not conceived as an additional agency 
but as a truly overarching coordination body for the 
various research councils. It cannot yet be said 
whether this group can fulfil its function — similar 
experiences in the UK are not too favourable — but 
the idea seems to be right: an institutional actor is 
created that has a direct interest in coordination 
while the remaining actors in the system focus upon 
the development of their sector-specific tasks. In 
Denmark, everything will depend on the influence 
this coordination group has on the research councils 
and on the inherent interests of research councils to 
engage themselves in coordination activities. It is for 
this reason that we think that a body that has re-
sources of its own to develop coordination activities 
in the field and which does not only act as a coordi-
nating body of existing agencies might be the better 
and more promising idea. 
In sum, political coordination of knowledge and 
innovation policy is not impossible and has been 
done quite successfully, for example in Finland, but 
it needs a number of conditions. The difficulties in 
developing such coordination in most countries 
point to the fact that these conditions are not easily 
achieved. Without the political will and skill nothing 
will be achieved and this political will can only be 
created within a forum-like structure at the cabinet 
level with a clear involvement of top policy-makers. 
The inclusion of strategic intelligence as a perma-
nent rationalising resource seems also to be impor-
tant. If the political will is clearly demonstrated at 
the cabinet level the creation of a superministry is 
superfluous and even unfavourable because it may 
endanger existing sectoral-specific activities. 
‘Enlightened’ external coordination seems to be the 
better way. Political coordination should not substi-
tute existing sectoral activities but be a latent means 
that can be called upon if necessary. The machinery 
of government should not be built on coordination 
structures. Sectoral and coordination structures 
should co-exist. 
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